Por meio de sua fisiopsicologia, isto é, da morfologia e doutrina do desenvolvimento da vontade de potência, Nietzsche avalia a condição impulsional de indivíduos e culturas. Assim, produções que afirmam a vida como um movimento contínuo de autossuperação são sintomas de uma dinâmica saudável; mórbidos são os organismos que procuram estratégias de conservação e paralisação das mudanças, como, por exemplo, a metafísica. Nesse contexto teórico, este artigo pretende investigar a reação de Nietzsche em face de um grande terremoto ocorrido em (...) Nice no ano de 1887, vivenciado pelo próprio filósofo. Nietzsche acredita ter a grande saúde, o que o habilita a rejeitar a busca, imposta por uma catástrofe à maioria dos seres humanos, de valores eternos em instâncias transcendentes. (shrink)

O niilismo é um tema importante em Genealogia da moral (1887) e está estreitamente associado a seus conceitos principais. No entanto, no parágrafo 12 da II Dissertação dessa obra, e somente nele, aparece o termo “niilismo administrativo” (administrativen Nihilismus) sem nenhuma explicação de seu sentido, a não ser que se trata de uma censura que Thomas Huxley fez a Herbert Spencer. Nesse parágrafo, Nietzsche apresenta o principal pressuposto de seu procedimento genealógico: a função de uma estrutura, seja ela um organismo (...) vivo ou uma instituição cultural, que ocorre em um determinado momento, não nos diz nada sobre a origem dessa mesma estrutura. Esse pressuposto, somado à noção de vontade de potência, antagoniza-se à concepção spenceriana de adaptação. Nesse contexto, o objetivo deste artigo, por meio principalmente da análise do ensaio Administrative Nihilism (1871) de Huxley, é esclarecer o papel que a rápida menção ao niilismo administrativo exerce no parágrafo citado de Genealogia da moral, especificamente na crítica nietzschiana contra Spencer. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is, in the context of the distinction between Nietzsche's notions of cultural philistine (Bildungsphilister) and free spirit (Freigeist), to discuss which of these two types we, professors at Brazilian higher education institutions, are more similar. The philistine is the opposite of the genuine man of culture and the artist. The free spirit, on the other hand, is the exception, he is one who is disconnected from the values and habits in force, he doesn't cling to (...) anything and walks freely. In this article, it is a matter of making some reflections, as we bring more questions than answers. (shrink)

Resumo: Nas poucas referências explícitas de Nietzsche ao biólogo alemão Ernst Haeckel, há uma clara rejeição de seu pensamento biológico e cultural. O objetivo deste artigo é propor que, apesar da pequena quantidade de citações diretas, os ataques de Nietzsche a Haeckel constituem um intenso antagonismo entre eles e inserem-se no contexto das críticas nietzschianas contra a formação e a cultura alemãs e contra a condição metafísica da ciência. O texto apresenta quatro aspectos do antagonismo entre Nietzsche e Haeckel: das (...) Darwinismus de Haeckel; a influência de Haeckel sobre David Strauss; a inclusão do evolucionismo científico no currículo na Alemanha; e o conflito entre Ludwig Rütimeyer e Haeckel.: In Nietzsche's few explicit references to German biologist Ernst Haeckel, there is a clear rejection of his biological and cultural thinking. The aim of this article is to propose that, despite the small amount of direct mentions, Nietzsche's criticism of Haeckel constitute an intense antagonism between them and are part place of the context of Nietzschean censure against the German education and culture and against the metaphysical condition of science. The text presents four aspects of the antagonism between Nietzsche and Haeckel: Haeckel’s Das Darwinismus; Haeckel's influence on David Strauss; the inclusion of scientific evolutionism in the curriculum in Germany; and the conflict between Ludwig Rütimeyer and Haeckel. (shrink)

The critiques against the concept of subject or the philosophy of subjectivity are very clear in the writings of Nietzsche. Despite these critiques, we can ask whether they result in overcoming the notion of subject or in a simple change of this conception, with the conservation of the general assumptions of a philosophy of subjectivity. In this article, which focuses on the aspect of multiplicity, we investigated whether the rejection of the unity of the subject is sufficient to reject also (...) the philosophy of subjectivity. We also showed that the Nietzschean critiques against the subject are very close to the criticism presented by the French philosopher and psychologist Théodule Ribot at his effort to the formation of an experimental psychology, without metaphysics. (shrink)

The protection of rare species abounds with scientific and ethical considerations. An ethical dilemma can emerge when the life of one species is valued higher than that of another, and so we discuss the basis of ranking, protection, and valuation of plants and animals. A duty to protect rare species exists in this age of great losses to plant and animal life, but the scientific and public communities are not always in agreement regarding what species deserve protection. Using a case (...) study, we illustrate how the decision to kill beavers to protect a rare plant and rare animals found in a tidewater creek demanded an ecological ethic approach. We present the concept of a" conservation mediator" and how its use may help find a common ground between stakeholders and decision-makers in similar situations. (shrink)

As is well known, Kant presents several versions of the Categorical Imperative in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Traditionally readers have focused on the “universal law” formulation of his famous moral principle. Friends of Kant have found in the FUL an appealingly formal and seemingly rigorous criterion for right action, while foes have found in it a convenient whipping boy. Recently, however, much attention has shifted to the “humanity” formulation of the Categorical Imperative. The shift is motivated partly (...) by a general exhaustion with the FUL and the problems it generates—for example, the emptiness charge, as well as the problem of false positives and false negatives—as well as by a widely accepted commitment to the general idea that every human being is worthy of respect. Scholars such as Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Christine Korsgaard, and Allen Wood have greatly enriched our understanding of Kant’s work by emphasizing the role of the FH in his moral theory. (shrink)

Resumo: Pretende-se neste artigo analisar a noção nietzschiana de filósofo do futuro e sua contribuição para o surgimento do novo homem, tendo em vista, prioritariamente, Além de bem e mal. Para tanto, iniciaremos analisando de que forma esta obra pode ser considerada, segundo a pretensão de seu autor, como uma crítica da modernidade e, consequentemente, de que forma ela se constitui como o manifesto de uma tarefa que Nietzsche define como própria dos filósofos do futuro: a superação do passado, ou (...) seja, das formas metafísicas, dogmáticas e ascéticas que orientaram a filosofia ao longo da história, por meio dos “trabalhadores filosóficos”, que agora devem ceder lugar aos autênticos filósofos, cujas lentes fisiopsicológicas examinam o pensamento como sintoma da saúde ou da doença de seus autores. Com isso, Nietzsche substitui a antiga tarefa do filósofo por uma nova missão. Com essa reflexão, acredita-se margear alguns dos problemas centrais da pesquisa do homenageado desse dossiê, prof. Wilson Antonio Frezzatti Jr.: This paper intends to analyze the Nietzschean notion of philosopher of the future and its contribution to the emergence of the new man, having in mind, primarily, Beyond good and evil. In order to do so, we will begin by analyzing how this work can be considered, according to the author’s intention, as a critique of modernity and, consequently, in what way it constitutes the manifesto of a task that Nietzsche defines as proper to the philosophers of the future: the overcoming of the past, that is, of the metaphysical, dogmatic and ascetic forms that have guided philosophy throughout history, through the “philosophical workers”, who must now give way to authentic philosophers, whose physiopsychological lenses examine thought as symptom of the health or illness of its authors. With this, Nietzsche replaces the philosopher’s old task with a new mission. With this reflection, it is believed that some of the central problems of the research of the honoree of this dossier, prof. Wilson Antonio Frezzatti Jr., are bordered. (shrink)

How are non-declarative sentences understood? How do they differ semantically from their declarative counterparts? Answers to these questions once made direct appeal to the notion of illocutionary force. When they proved unsatisfactory, the fault was diagnosed as a failure to distinguish properly between mood and force. For some years now, efforts have been under way to develop a satisfactory account of the semantics of mood. In this paper, we consider the current achievements and future prospects of the mood-based semantic programme.

When people speak, their words never fully encode what they mean, and the context is always compatible with a variety of interpretations. How can comprehension ever be achieved? Wilson and Sperber argue that comprehension is an inference process guided by precise expectations of relevance. What are the relations between the linguistically encoded meanings studied in semantics and the thoughts that humans are capable of entertaining and conveying? How should we analyse literal meaning, approximations, metaphors and ironies? Is the ability (...) to understand speakers' meanings rooted in a more general human ability to understand other minds? How do these abilities interact in evolution and in cognitive development? MEANING AND RELEVANCE sets out to answer these and other questions, enriching and updating relevance theory and exploring its implications for linguistics, philosophy, cognitive science and literary studies. (shrink)

This landmark study examines the role played by the rediscovery of the writings of the ancient atomists, Epicurus and Lucretius, in the articulation of the major philosophical systems of the seventeenth century, and, more broadly, their influence on the evolution of natural science and moral and political philosophy. The target of sustained and trenchant philosophical criticism by Cicero, and of opprobrium by the Christian Fathers of the early Church, for its unflinching commitment to the absence of divine supervision and the (...) finitude of life, the Epicurean philosophy surfaced again in the period of the Scientific Revolution, when it displaced scholastic Aristotelianism. Both modern social contract theory and utilitarianism in ethics were grounded in its tenets. Catherine Wilson shows how the distinctive Epicurean image of the natural and social worlds took hold in philosophy, and how it is an acknowledged, and often unacknowledged presence in the writings of Descartes, Gassendi, Hobbes, Boyle, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley. With chapters devoted to Epicurean physics and cosmology, the corpuscularian or "mechanical" philosophy, the question of the mortality of the soul, the grounds of political authority, the contested nature of the experimental philosophy, sensuality, curiosity, and the role of pleasure and utility in ethics, the author makes a persuasive case for the significance of materialism in seventeenth-century philosophy without underestimating the depth and significance of the opposition to it, and for its continued importance in the contemporary world. Lucretius's great poem, On the Nature of Things, supplies the frame of reference for this deeply-researched inquiry into the origins of modern philosophy. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of consciousness are based on widely different concepts of its nature, most or all of which probably embody aspects of the truth about it. Starting with a concept of consciousness indicated by the phrase “the feeling of what happens” (the title of a book by Antonio Damásio), we attempt to build a framework capable of supporting and resolving divergent views. We picture consciousness in terms of Reality experiencing itself from the perspective of cognitive agents. Each conscious experience is (...) regarded as composed of momentary feeling events that are combined by recognition and evaluation into extended conscious episodes that bind cognitive contents with a wide range of apparent durations (0.1 secs to 2 or more secs, for us humans, depending on circumstances and context). Three necessary conditions for the existence of consciousness are identified: a) a ground of Reality, envisaged as an universal field of potentiality encompassing all possible manifestations, whether material or 'mental'; b) a transitional zone, leading to; c) a manifest world with its fundamental divisions into material, 'informational' and quale-endowed aspects. We explore ideas about the nature of these necessary conditions, how they may relate to one another and whether our suggestions have empirical implications. (shrink)

This article explores three ways in which physics may involve counterpossible reasoning. The first way arises when evaluating false theories: to say what the world would be like if the theory were true, we need to evaluate counterfactuals with physically impossible antecedents. The second way relates to the role of counterfactuals in characterizing causal structure: to say what causes what in physics, we need to make reference to physically impossible scenarios. The third way is novel: to model metaphysical dependence in (...) physics, we need to consider counterfactual consequences of metaphysical impossibilities. Physics accordingly bears substantial and surprising counterpossible commitments. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between eugenics, disability, and dehumanization, with a focus on forms of eugenics beyond Nazi eugenics.

The author uses social epistemology to develop the cognitive authority theory. The fundamental concept of cognitive authority is that people construct knowledge in two different ways: based on their first-hand experience or on what they have learned second-hand from others. What people learn first-hand depends on the stock of ideas they bring to the interpretation and understanding of their encounters with the world. People primarily depend on others for ideas as well as for information outside the range of direct experience. (...) Much of what they think of the world is what they have gained second-hand. All that people know of the world beyond the narrow range of their own lives is what others have told them. However, people do not count all hearsay as equally reliable; only those who are deemed to “know what they are talking about” become cognitive authorities. --. (shrink)

The Making of British Bioethics provides the first in-depth study of how philosophers, lawyers and other 'outsiders' came to play a major role in discussing and helping to regulate issues that used to be left to doctors and scientists. It details how British bioethics emerged thanks to a dynamic interplay between sociopolitical concerns and the aims of specific professional groups and individuals who helped create the demand for outside involvement and transformed themselves into influential 'ethics experts'. Highlighting this interplay helps (...) us appreciate how issues such as embryo research and assisted dying became high-profile 'bioethical' concerns in the late twentieth century, and why different groups now play a critical role in developing regulatory standards and leading public debates. The book draws on a wide range of original sources and will be of interest to historians of medicine and science, general historians and bioethicists. (shrink)

I explain why, from the perspective of knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology, objective act consequentialist theories of ethics imply skepticism about the moral status of our prospective actions and also tend to be self-defeating, undermining the justification of consequentialist theories themselves. For according to knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology there are modal anti-luck demands on both knowledge and justification, and it turns out that our beliefs about the moral status of our prospective actions are almost never able to satisfy these demands if objective act (...) consequentialism is true. This kind of applied moral skepticism introduces problematic limits on our ability to use objective act consequentialism’s explanatory power as evidence for its truth. This is, in part, a product of higher-order defeat as I explain in the final section. There is, however, a silver lining for objective act consequentialists. For there is at least one type of objective act consequentialism, prior existence consequentialism, that is poised to avoid at least some of the epistemic problems discussed in this paper. (shrink)

Let us begin with the simple observation that applied mathematics can be very tough! It is a common occurrence that basic physical principle instructs us to construct some syntactically simple set of differential equations, but it then proves almost impossible to extract salient information from them. As Charles Peirce once remarked, you can’t get a set of such equations to divulge their secrets by simply tilting at them like Don Quixote. As a consequence, applied mathematicians are often forced to pursue (...) roundabout and shakily rationalized expedients if any useful progress is to be made. Often these provisional and quasi-empirical procedures within applied mathematics loom large in motivating the “anti-realist” or “anti-unificationist” conclusions of Nancy Cartwright and allied authors. (shrink)